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Abstract
This papers aims at understanding the role of sense when actors improvise during crisis. 
Literature about improvisation show little explanation of how individual improvisation 
becomes collective and coherent. The use of the concept of sense as a bridge between crisis 
and improvisation enable us to identify three mechanisms related to sense that contribute to 
organizational improvisation in crisis response –detection, mobilization, response- as well as 
mechanisms that take part into the collective turn of crisis response through improvisation.
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Introduction
This paper addresses the mystery of organizational improvisation in crisis response by relying 
on the concept of sense.
Indeed, improvisation has been identified as a major dimension of crisis response, but the 
conceptualization of organizational improvisation has remained incomplete. Even if crisis 
response relies on collective processes, there is little understanding of how improvisation 
moves from an individual to a collective level. Individual improvisation does not necessarily 
imply a whole organization can produce consistent improvisation. More fundamentally, there 
is little knowledge on how improvisation happens in organizations that handle crises. One the 
one hand, improvisation seems a natural way to tackle the unexpected aspect of a crisis 
situation. On the other hand making sense of a critical situation is more difficult. As 
improvisation and innovation are often perceived as risky, crisis responders tend to rely on 
procedures   and   routine.   The   lack   of   knowledge   on   the   occurrence   of   organizational 
improvisation   makes   managers   lack   concrete   recommendations   on   how   to   manage 
improvisation during crises.
In other words, this work tackles the two following research questions: 
- How does improvisation happen in organizations during crisis response? 
- How   does   organizational   improvisation   emerge   as   a   collective   mode   of   crisis 
response?
This work attempts to explain how improvisation concretely happens during crisis response 
and transform into collective improvisation. As literature suggests, we heavily rely on the 
concept of sense to respond to the research questions. Literature on sense and improvisation 
suggests sense making is a core ingredient of individual and organizational improvisation.
On the one hand, crises are specific situations when making sense of what is happening is 
problematic (Weick, 1988, 1993). On the other hand, actors have to create specific sense from 
the situation in order to respond the crisis. In this context, improvisation implies being able to 
make sense of a clues in the environment in order to propose new action considering the 
unique situation the actors have to face.
We led a retrospective analysis of the response from the national health network in Paris to 
1the 2003 Heat Wave crisis. From the 4
th to the 16
th of August, 14,802 people died because of 
hyperthermia. Most of them were old people who lived alone in urban zones. During this 
period, the temperature attained highest levels since 1976. In Paris region, emergency units 
were overwhelmed with people suffering from hyperthermia. Decision makers struggled to 
figure the mortality rate and the real causes of death. France, in particular the northern areas 
typically do not experience high temperature heat, even in the summer months, and heat was 
never considered as a major hazard. The phenomenon they had to respond to was unknown 
and threatening. 
Our analysis reveals that three required steps in sense making in order to improvise during 
crises: detection, mobilization and response. We present how sense making contributes to 
crisis detection. Once some actors detected the crisis, some of them got mobilized to fight the 
crisis. We show here that sense develops on psychological and emotional levers that made 
some actors ready to fight the crisis. Then, we explain how specific sense making, based on 
new connection between problems and solutions, restriction of aims scope and emergency 
feeling enabled some people to improvise during the crisis. Finally we show how people 
move from individual sense making of the crisis to coherent collective improvisation. We 
explain how discourse and exemplary action get other people either to detect the crisis they 
did not realize yet of to get mobilized.
1. Theoretical background
In this section we review literature on organizational crisis and improvisation that takes place 
during crisis response, that we call  crisis improvisation. Also we present some the main 
concepts and ideas that emerged from the field: Sense making is a crucial component of crisis 
improvisation
1. Organizational crisis during disasters
Organizational crisis is a critical experience that threatens organizations major goals and 
values (Hermann, 1963). In spite of important time pressure, organizational crisis requires 
quick and innovative response sometimes by improvising (Crossan, 1998). In fact, stakes and 
costs of a mishandled crisis are not only material but also social (Dynes, Quarantelli, 1976), 
which causes important stress and emotional pressure (Smart, Vertinsky, 1977; Milburn, 
Schuler, Watman, 1983).
Disasters are different from crisis in that they refer to massive material and human damage 
(Perry,   Quarantelli,   2005)   that   disturb   organizational   functioning   enough   to   trigger 
organizational crises (Pearson, Claire, 1998). This is what happened during the 2003 French 
heat wave (Lalande et al., 2005). The temperature elevation was a natural disaster: it favored 
drought, fires and electricity breakout all other Europe. It also triggered organizational crisis 
within the French health network by threatening its functioning and primary mission: taking 
care of citizens (Lalande et al., 2005).
This   means   that   organizations   have   to   manage   both   disaster   response   and   potential 
organizational crises during disasters. They participate in alleviating material and human 
damage coupled with unexpected incidents that are correlated to the disaster. For instance, 
during the 9/11 or Katrina, hospitals, emergency units, and police services struggled to save 
lives.   They  also   spent  a certain   amount   of  time   and  energy  reestablishing   electrical 
infrastructure that were necessary for their functioning (Mendonça, 2007). During the heat 
wave, the health network had to manage their own shortages of resources, lack of information 
and overwhelmed nurses. 
Responding to organizational crisis in disasters, organizations face important complexity and 
uncertainty. Complexity stems from the intricate set of interdependent outcomes from the 
crisis (Milburn et al., 1983). Complexity requires organizations to make do with available 
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2. Crisis improvisation
Beyond its occurrence in crisis situations, improvisation has been frequently associated with 
crisis situations in the literature (Hutchins, 1991; Ciborra, 1996 a; Rerup, 2001), even if the 
conceptual   ties   between   improvisation   and   crisis   response   remain   loosely   coupled. 
Improvisation refers to a very limited delay between acting and planning (Moorman, Miner, 
1998),   which   results   in   a   seemingly   extemporaneous   action   (Weick,   1998).   Also 
improvisation includes novelty of action, also called  bricolage (Cunha, Cunha, Kamoche, 
1999). Improvisation occurs in crisis response because of strong time pressure, complexity 
and uncertainty (Crossan, Cunha, Vera, Cunha, 2005) and also because planning is not always 
relevant in that resilience is needed (Rerup, 2001) and every crisis is unique (Waugh, Streib, 
2006).
Improvisation becomes difficult to manage when a whole organization has to improvise 
together (Hutchins, 1991). It requires efficient interactions (Weick, 1998) and the ability from 
actors to properly interpret other’s actions and adjust to them.
3.  Sense as a central element in collective improvisation during crisis response
Here we undertake the task to explain how sense could lead actors to improvise so as to 
respond to crisis. In other words, as research has faced difficulties to explain why some 
people improvise during crisis and other do not, on which basis people improvise during 
crises, etc. we propose to use sense as a tool to explore the relation between crisis and 
improvisation. More precisely, we aim at indentifying how people make sense of a crisis 
situation when they improvise.
Connections between crisis improvisation, sense and crisis are intricately intertwined. First, 
crisis situations endangered routinely developed sense. Weick (1993) has exposed how sense 
may collapse during crises. He also explained how sense provides a tool to react to crises 
(Weick, 1988). We face here a paradox of sense during crises. On the one hand, sense 
collapses during crises: routines do not work anymore, many elements in the environment 
change, temporality changes towards short delays, etc. The sense that used to be mobilized 
routinely is no more efficient to grasp reality. On the other hand, creating new sense is a 
necessary   mean   to   respond   to   the   crisis.   Actors   have   to   reorganize   clues   from   the 
environment, reconsider their roles, their goals and what they feel in order to behave in line 
with the situation. Understanding this paradox of sense during crisis – collapse and necessity 
– is of great importance in order to understand how improvisation happens in crises.
Interestingly enough there has been little reflection on the connection between crisis, sense 
making and improvisation. Research about sense making partly addresses the mystery of 
collective improvisation: What makes collective improvisation consistent, in spite of short 
delay for coordination and communication? For Laroche (2003), Roux-Dufort (2003) and 
Vidaillet (2003), collective improvisation, especially during crisis response, is conditioned by 
collective sense making. Individuals interact together and collectively reflect about the crisis 
situations, which is core ingredient for crisis response. These studies provide an original 
framework to study improvisation and bricolage during crises. But they do not provide clear 
explanations of improvisation in spite of somewhat exploring it sources. In other words, we 
still miss elements on how sense making contributes to improvisation during crisis response. 
For this reason we propose a new framework that will at least explain how sense making 
participate in crisis improvisation.
We characterize sense as the way people grasp the reality through cognitive elements, affects 
and aims (Garreau, 2009). The three poles – cognition, aims, and affects – interact in order to 
provide the sense given to the situation. First, cognition includes both beliefs and knowledge. 
3For instance it includes professional values that are literally beliefs about what should be 
completed to get the job well done or what some professionals should do in a specific 
situation. Second, affects refer to emotion and physical sensation that are both important 
during crisis because of surprise, time and emotional pressure, and damage when crisis is 
triggered by a disaster. Finally, aims describe actors’ purpose and the particular state they 
intend to attain. Aims are particularly diverse; they embrace individual aspects, like be 
recognized from others as well as collective ones like respond to the crisis. A specific 
combination of the elements of these three poles – cognition, aims, and affects – enables 
actors to make sense of a situation.
Making sense is framed as a loop. The actors can make sense of the situation as being a crisis 
that they have to face. Then, a plausibility test (Weick, 1995) is consciously or unconsciously 
applied to the sense give to the situation. If the sense given to the situation is plausible, the 
actors will reify the situation as a crisis. If not, actors will review elements of the sense 
making process in order to modify the sense given to the situation.
Figure 1: Process of making sense of a crisis
Source: adapted from Garreau (2009)
While analyzing this framework, we get interrogations about how this process enables actors 
to respond to crisis. First, how do actors detect a crisis? Is this process only a match between 
clues in a given situation and what the actors previously know as elements of a crisis? Or are 
there any other elements that take part into the sense making process that make people sense 
that the situation is a crisis? What is the role of emotions in that process?
Then, once the situation has been sensed as a crisis, what are the elements of sense that make 
some people improvise? What is the influence of the actor’s perception of their own role 
when they make sense of the situation and improvise during the crisis? Do groups of actors 




















4differences that make each individual unique in his response to the crisis?
The potential answers to the first two sets of questions would not provide us with levers that 
people can control in order to improvise collectively. We may also wonder how some actors 
can act in this context in order to provide all actors with the elements that make them 
improvise the crisis in a way that fits with the crisis situation. Are there levers in order to 
control, even partly, the sense given to the situation? How is it possible to make people sense 
the crisis a certain way so that they engage in an improvisation process?
Our study tackles a complex phenomenon and raises many questions about the role of sense in 
the improvisation process necessary to react to crises. We could answer some of the questions 
we raise here through an empirical study that we introduce now.
2. Methodology: Developing a grounded analysis to explain the 
relationship   between   crisis   response   and   organizational 
improvisation
4. Case study design
A case study method suited to our goal of generating theoretical elements in an area where 
little theory exists (Yin, 2003). We had to find a case study that would reveal a process of 
improvisation during a crisis, where we could interview people in order to have access to the 
sense they give to the situation.
We selected the case of how a Public Health Organizations Net has responded to the issue of 
the French heat wave in 2003 because of the general agreement of considering the situation as 
a crisis  a posteriori. In August 2003, the weather suddenly got scorching in France and 
attained record temperatures (46 C, e.g.130 F) in for the first time since 1976. August is 
usually a time for vacation so the population enjoyed the heat during the first days. But the 
reality of the heat wave quickly got less glamorous. Injuries rapidly grew: old people, 
especially in urban spaces, were not able to face hyperthermia and 14,802 people died in 
France between the 4th and the 20th of August. The heat wave was depicted as a natural 
disaster that provoked an organizational crisis in hospitals (Lalande et al., 2005). Not only 
units were overwhelmed with sick people but they also faced unexpected shortages of drugs, 
water, ice, air conditioners and even nurses. Morgues in hospitals were also overcrowded with 
bodies and many electric devices overheated and broke down. Moreover physicians struggled 
to diagnose and cure hyperthermia because medical knowledge on heat waves was almost 
inexistent. Information on victims was also lacking. The Health Department struggled to 
record the number of deaths due to the heat wave until December. As a result the health 
department was hardly able to provide resources or directions to handle the situation.
Facing shortages of resources and lack of information, hospitals managers, nurses and 
physicians   improvised.   For   instance,   they   spontaneously   substituted   lacking   medical 
accessories by paintings hooks to hang up hydrating solutions, they put air conditioners on 
wheels to chill more places.
Theoretical sampling consists of choosing samples that depict well the phenomenon under 
study (Mason, 2002). We led preliminary analysis to confirm that the 2003 French Heat Wave 
could be labeled as a case of a disaster that provoked an organizational crisis in medical 
structures. The 2003 heat wave was explicitly presented as a “crisis” from numerous sources 
of data. Plus, many specificities of this episode match to our definition of crisis such as death 
rate, time and emotional pressure. Surprise was also a major dimension of the heat wave, like 
it is for most of crises. Actors had not experienced such a situation before and insisted nothing 
could have prepared them to the heat wave. We focus our study on the Parisian region, also 
called  Ile-de-France. The situation in this region was more chaotic than others because 
5responders did not have the same amount of knowledge on hyperthermia as other regions. 
Buildings in the Ile-de-France region were not conceived for high temperatures, which 
prevented nurses from finding cool places for patients. Plus, many of hospitals staff go away 
from the Ile-de-France region during the month of August for vacation, which provoked a 
burning lack of human resources to cope with the overwhelming number of patients. 
Moreover, the crisis lasted for several weeks and provides us with different steps, where 
several steps of sensing the crisis and waves of improvisation have been observed. In that 
way, the 2003 French Heat Wave meets the criteria of an “ideal case”, in which theoretical 
interest and practical situation fits and provide us with data that would provide clearer 
analysis than other cases.
Data sources
Data sources are at least double: retrospective interviews with diverse actors such as nurses, 
physicians, managers, directors, (13 interviews so far) and extended analysis of archives that 
are numerous and diverse: research articles, national and international reports, newspapers 
archives, internal documents (67 reports and articles, 80 newspapers archives). Preliminary 
data analysis allowed us to iteratively refine the interviewer guide and the theoretical 
sampling. We also rely on snowball sampling techniques to collect data. To do this, we ask 
interviewees to help us to contact colleagues they were in touch with during the crisis. Doing 
so, we were assured to triangulate people’s perception on the same events. 
So far we have identified difficulties in the data collection that are specific to the 2003 French 
heat wave case study. We strive to respond to them by systematic triangulation (Mathison, 
1988). We noticed that crisis and improvisation were most of the time taboo subjects for 
interviewees. For example, some managers are reluctant to present the heat wave as a critical 
situation in which they had to improvise because such a description conveys a negative image 
on their own work. Still, for each interview, interviewees admitted at some point they had no 
choice other than improvisation. Another major difficulty is embellishment bias from 
interviewees (Mitchell, Thompson, 1994) who tend to convey a misleading and deceptively 
positive picture of the crisis response. To manage such difficulties, we systematically 
triangulate different sources of data with each other (Mathison, 1988). 
5. Data analysis
We led an interpretive study through an abductive process. On the one hand, we have a crisis 
situation where people have increasingly improvise to respond the crisis. On the other hand, 
we have the framework of sense making as depicted above. We used the sense framework to 
try to interpret the data. We focus our analysis of data on the sense given to the situation 
through cognitive elements, affects and aims. We looked for plausible explanations for 
understanding why and how people improvise during the French heat wave. Once identified, 
the propositions have been tested on the whole set of data. Some propositions appeared to be 
fallacious as they did not adhere to the collected data of the case study. The three steps 
process and the three inherent positions have found significant validation on the data and can 
be proposed as results for our study.
3. The   emergence   of   sense   as   a   bridge   between   crises   and 
organizational improvisation
Sense as the way people grasp the reality of a situation through cognitive elements, aims and 
affects enables to adopt a new research lens to tackle improvisation during crisis. The 
framework exposed above enabled us accounts for improvisation in crisis situations through 
sense. We identified three key processes necessary for crisis response where sense plays a 
support role: detection, mobilization, response.
6Figure 2: Crisis response through the lens a sense: three main phases
When first patients died, sense collapsed. The cause of deaths was unknown and physicians, 
who first thought the origin of deaths was infectious, did not understand why treatments were 
useless. Also hospitals knew something large was happening no one had any idea about the 
real number of deaths. Sense was still rebuilt to cope with the situation. The three processes 
we describe here in – detection, mobilization and response - were necessary to react 
collectively to a crisis. The retroaction loops enables more and more actors to get involved 
into the improvisation process required to respond to the crisis. In the next paragraphs, we 
detail these three processes and the specific aspects of sense that have a high role in each of 
them.
6. Sense as a way to detect crisis
Affects, cognitions and aims allowed actors to detect crisis and transmit alerts, which 
mentally prepared them to improvise.
In emergency units, responders were highly sensitive to the fact more people were arriving 
but the reasons of their suffering was unknown. Their professional values were endangered 
and gained even higher value. Professionals felt their very aim – taking care of patients – was 
questioned, which led them to detect the critical aspect of the situations and alert. Some of 
them explain:
“The situation was exciting, impressing, and we discovered it progressively. It was the 
first time we had the feeling that no matter we did we could not fully resolve the 
situation. The most astonishing was that we felt professionally incapable of medically 
to the situation. Even this time though, we faced the situation”.
Professional values made them call their superiors to warn about the situation. Some directors 
called the DDASS (Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales) “to say the 
situation is  not  normal”. Otherwise institutions had many calls from hospital units and 
colleagues who were concerned about the situation.
Moreover the sensation of heat helped actors to detect the situation was about to become 
delicate. As some director explained: “The weather was hot, very hot. I immediately felt the 
weekend would be tricky. I was not wrong, the situation quickly became difficult”.
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detected yetThe combination of the heat sensation with the fact that the staff realized that there was an 
unexpected need for bottles in some hospitals triggered some director’s curiosity and alerted 
them something was about to happen.
Moreover, at a broader scale, the medical network had developed a system of signal to detect 
exceptions and accidents. For example, some hospitals that are more difficult to manage than 
others situation serve as signals. Some director use the metaphor of the canary in the mines to 
qualify some hospital whose problems always appear first and warn about potential danger.
“When this hospital calls me to warn about difficulties, I am sure there is something is 
going on over there, so I call them to know what happen and I also call other 
hospitals to be sure everything is going on well”.
To conclude, different mechanisms associated to affects, cognition and aims contributed to 
crisis detection, as it is represented in the following figure.
Figure 3: Sense in the detection phase
7. Sense making as lever for mobilization
Second, cognition and professional aims strengthened individual involvement and action 
flexibility. Both enabled organizations to count on actors who adjusted their actions to 
improvisation.
Other responders were disturbed because the main mission of taking care of patients was 
endangered by the situation. Still, they also oriented their efforts in alleviating the feeling of 
heat. Their sense of their own mission was stronger and led them to multiply efforts and make 
do, in spite of local conflicts and misunderstandings. As some manager explains:
“Retrospectively, we had minor conflicts about the patient flow, by this system we got 
some very loud cases, people who were socially disabled for example. But we 
completed our work, no matter who they were”.
Mobilization was influenced by strong professional and human values. Emotion was also a 
lever for mobilization. Actors were shocked by the inappropriateness of buildings and the 
number of patients.
« The whole situation was not only exhausting but also revolting. Revolting because I 
was already in a difficult service and the heat wave made things all the more 
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→Sense given to the situation : a crisis is happeningcomplicated to manage ».
Mobilization in hospitals and emergency units during the heat wave was particularly high. 
The situation was dramatic and stakes important, which attributed importance to everyone 
involvement in the response. This is how some responders explain why mobilization was so 
strong. More than mobilization, this feeling of contributing to manage a national difficult 
situation also enabled people to make do, to establish new patterns of interactions between 
services that were not used to communicate with each other before. Responding to this kind of 
the situation was difficult, but at least the best part of their work.
“At least, the heat wave gave sense to our work [Be there whatever happens to care 
for patients], which made us more able to manage difficulties”.
Cognition, professional aims and emotion made professionals realize the need to react and 
mobilize for crisis response, which is summarized in figure 4.
Figure 4: Sense in the mobilization phase
8. Improvised crisis response hinging on sense making
Third, cognition and affects helped actors to develop a common sense of emergency, which 
enabled them to go beyond planned procedures and innovate from routine.
Physical sensation as the lack for water was a factor of improvised response. The water 
responders had access to was too hot to be drunk. Therefore hospitals tried to provide 
drinkable water sometimes by improvising and going to supermarkets. 
“There was no drinkable water anymore so the director used his own car to go to the 
Carrefour supermarket over there and bring back bottles of water”.
Also, the heat exhausted people and led them to be quicker and more efficient, sometimes 
developing more convenient patterns of action. For example, the sensation of heat combined 
with time pressure and required flexibility led nurses to put air conditioners on wheels to cool 
down as much places as possible.
In spite of the situation being particularly hard -Parisian architecture is not well fitted for high 
temperatures, some infrastructures were too old, space was missing- professional values were 
a determinant for adaptation to the situation. For instance, staff had to improvise with 
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crisis
9equipment, but also mortuary chamber that were full.
“The mortuary chamber was full, so someone asked me to put two bodies in each 
space. I said no, for the sake of dead people, so we found new ways to resolve the 
situation. We found some military beds, we dropped the temperature and we put 
bodies on beds”.
Knowledge and good sense were basic tools to face the situation and to manage the lack of 
equipment. For instance to manage the lack of air conditioners, nurses put bed sheets in the 
water and put them on windows. Responders described it as improvisation but also good 
sense, in spite of not being taught in nurses’ school.
“This is what a mother tries to take care of her child, putting water so as to make the 
body temperature drop”.
Ideas association and cognitive reframing were basis for improvised response. For instance 
actors   used   painting   hooks   to   substitute   hydrating   solution   hooks.   They   probably 
unconsciously associated the two uses of hooks. Similarly the analogy between the nurse’s 
task to take care of the patient and the mother’s caring for her own child led nurses to be more 
creative and find new resources to handle suffering.
Finally, the contact with death also made sense for efficiency and enriched professional aims. 
More than applying procedures, nurses and managers intended to do everything possible to 
respond to the crisis and solve issues. As we describe in this section, it led them to 
continuously improvise.
“It really was the time our work made sense and we strove to find new ways to 
alleviate the patients’ suffering. It came from the presence of death. When people die 
our work is essential and we make everything possible to cure them”.
Actors felt specific actions were necessary to handle the situation from their affects, cognition 
and aims.
10Figure 5: sense in the response phase
9. The collective dimension of improvisation
We have explained till now individual improvisation through the lenses of the sense. We now 
explain how improvisation became collective. The most striking element is that improvisation 
has been done a coherent way: all improvised actions reinforced the results of previously 
achieved results. In the end, most experts agree that improvisation enabled an efficient 
response to the crisis
1. We identified three mechanisms that enabled people who behaved 
according to the crisis situation either to lead others to make sense of the situation so that they 
realize that they face a crisis, or to mobilize them according to health care mission toward 
such crisis. These mechanisms are presented on figure 2 as the retroaction loops that go from 
response to detection or mobilization.
Three  main  mechanisms  contributed   to  make   improvisation  collective.   First,   informal 
discussion between responders helped to discuss about new ways of doing. For example some 
managers told the author about her conversation about water and sheets in the elevator.
“How is it going on?”
“Bad, the temperature is too high and we do not know what to do?”
“Do you have sheets and water?”
“Yes”
“So you put the sheets in the water and you put the sheets on the window”.
This type of informal conversations enabled increased mobilization of actors. Not only 
because they could mention innovative practices to cope with the situation but also because 
inter-individual was reinforce to build a higher sense of collectivism among health care staff, 
as this quotations shows.
“It was 10 pm and the heat was incredible. And hmm… there were nobody in the 
streets. I was waiting for the bus with a physician. He looked at me and it was like…
we could not say anything. We were so exhausted that we only looked at each other’s 
and we understood each other’s. There was no work to describe the situation”.
Witnessing improvisation also widespread practices through imitation. As actors had to 
1 The amount of dead people is high but as soon as the situation has been identified as a crisis (phase 1), the 
number of dead people reduced and improvisation prevented the amount of deaths from being much higher.
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spread the sense of crisis in all health care departmentsorganize to tackle the crisis situation, they sometimes copied what they saw in other services. 
Going through a corridor or looking at media could provide good hint about practices to set 
into motion.
Finally, institutions provided with formal direction to spread new practices, by sharing by 
phone new ideas and practices and sending emails and faxes with recommendations. Our data 
suggests the remembrance of the support from institutions in developing new and more 
efficient practices is still vivid. For instance a lot of interviewees mentioned the support from 
the AP
2 to inform about putting sheets into water and using ice to alleviate suffering from 
hyperthermia.
These three mechanisms enabled collective improvisation to be coherent. As collective 
improvisation based on informal discussion, ad hoc copying practices and formal institutional 
communication of best practices to spread, the response to 2003 French heat Wave reached a 
high degree of coherence. People got able to cope with this crisis situation using professional 
knowledge,  a high degree of professionalism and their  human  levers, like emotional 
implication. 
4. Final considerations
10. A new insight in organizational improvisation
Our use of the sense making framework enabled us to provide a new insight for researchers to 
deal with organizational improvisation. We identify three main stages of sense making that 
help actors to implement improvisation individually and collectively. Consistently to findings 
from previous research (Weick, 1988, 1993) our study shows that improvisation required 
responders to move from a sense collapse to a renewal of sense.
Our analysis shows that improvisation is different from bricolage in uncertain situations. 
Bricolage implies the reuse of elements never considered the way they will be used for a 
specific situation. Here, improvisation goes further than known elements as people discover 
new solutions as they are acting, which makes improvisation extemporaneous (Moorman, 
Miner, 1998), in contrast to bricolage.
11. Managerial considerations
We have seen that crisis respond starts with individual sense making first. Detection and 
mobilization achieve a high collective rate when actors respond to the crisis. It seems that first 
movers played a role of leader in this process. The three main mechanism of collective 
response that we identified are based on the fact that people get emotionally affected by the 
situation. We may consider that affective communication through verbal or unverbal means is 
the quickest way to mobilize people to respond a crisis.
However, affect-based communication could lead to incoherent practices. Coherence has 
raised here with copying best practices that have been identified as exemplar by other 
professionals, and formal communication via institutions. The balance between affective 
response and rational response allowed improvisation to be quick and coherent. These two 
means should be used by managers to get a high degree of both coherence and speed in crisis 
response. Unbalanced communication could either lead to rational, meticulous bit non fast 
enough response, or, on the other hand to quick but disorganized response.
Moreover, we have seen that if detection and mobilization first come from individual process, 
institutions play a large role in making the responses coherent. In light of these findings, 
collective efficient responses to crisis can be considered as a process that is both emergent 
from the fields and organized by institutions. Efficient improvisation has to be organized but 
much space should be allowed for on the field initiatives. Institutions should not try to over 
2 AP – Assistance Publique. It is a group of public hospitals in the Parisian region.
12control crisis response. Actors react as they feel personally engaged in the process of 
responding the crisis. Too much control could prevent actors from feeling they have a specific 
human role to play in such crises.
12. Limits of the study
The managerial considerations we proposed are based on considerations when human crises 
are happening. Some situations, described as crises, but which do not imply large scale human 
suffering differ much from the case we studied. Disasters like rocket explosion, electricity 
overall breakdown, do not fit our definition of crisis. They may be considered with other 
types of mechanisms that the one we shed light on. Analytical generalization (Yin, 2003) 
would provide insights for other crisis than the 2003 French heat wave, but researchers have 
to take care that the considered cases fit with our delimitated consideration of crises.
The method used for our study can be criticized, as we tackle a crisis that took place six years 
ago. We led retrospective interview, which may cause biases in the collected data. Many 
things happened both in actors’ lives and in the health care sector, which can modify the 
expression of the actual actors’ sense making during the crisis. We tried to limit this bias in 
triangulating data sources. Reports and newspapers article were used to have “live” data, 
which allowed us to validate most of actors’ speech in the interviews. Moreover, we asked 
different actors to talk about the same events. While doing this, we could get a more precise 
view of the general tendencies of sense making during the crises. Nevertheless, while much 
precaution has been taken to deal with retrospective bias, it cannot be considered as totally 
erased in our study.
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